The traditional commons is distinct from what Henry Smith calls a "semicommons."
See Henry E. Smith, "Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
Fields," _Journal_of_Legal_Studies_ 29 (2000): 131 (defining a semicommons as a mix of
common and private rights where both are significant and interact).

While the standard view is that a commons induces overuse, some argue that it may
inspire underuse. Compare Richard A. Posner, _Economic_Analysis_of_Law,_ 4th ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), 32, with Frank I. Michelman, "Ethics, Economics and
the Law of Property," in _Ethics,_Economics,_and_the_Law,_ J. Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, Nomos XXIV [series],
1982), 25-27.

[2-2] The OED was compiled from the volunteer efforts of thousands of people sending
examples of usage to editors. See Simon Winchester, _The_Professor_and_the_Madman:_A_
_Tale_of_Murder,_Insanity,_and_the_Making_of_the_Oxford_English_Dictionary_ (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1998).

[2-3] _The_Oxford_English_Dictionary,_ 2nd ed., vol. 3, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C.
Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 567.

[2-4] The observant will notice that a resource offered in conditions of perfect competi-
tion comes close to the conditions that I described obtain with a commons, even though
the resource is "owned." Perfect competition constrains the owner in similar ways,
though the right not to sell at all distinguishes the two sets of constraints.

[2-5] This is the essence of an entitlement protected by a property rule. See Guido Cala-
bresi and Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral," _Harvard_Law_Review_ 85 (1972): 1089, 1092. Not all liability rule
cases will eliminate this core of discretion. But the system is structured to avoid it.

[2-6] Virgil, _Virgil_in_English_Rhythm,_ 2nd ed., Robert Corbet Singleton, trans. (London:
Bell and Daldy [imprint], 1871), iii-iv ("There is a common of language to which both
poetry and prose have the freest access.").

[2-7] Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," _Science_ 162 (1968): 1243. The
idea of congestion externalities of course predates Hardin. See Posner, "Economic
Analysis of Law," 32-34, citing Frank H. Knight, "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of
Social Cost," _Quarterly_Journal_of_Economics_ 38 (1924): 582.

[2-8] Hardin, 1244 (emphasis added).

[2-9] Ostrom, ch. 3; Robert C. Ellickson, _Order_Without_Law:_How_Neighbors_Settle_Dis-_
_putes_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). See also _Making_the_Com-_
_mons_Work:_Theory,_Practice_and_Policy,_ Daniel W. Bromley, ed. (San Francisco: ICS
Press, 1992), part 2 (describing case studies).

[2-10] Elinor Ostrom has been the most effective in demonstrating the "fallacy" of the
"tragedy of the commons." As she writes:

____ What makes these models so dangerous -- when they are used metaphorically as the
____ foundation for policy -- is that the constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose
____ of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless some external au-
____ thorities change them.

Ostrom, 6-7. For example, in an article in 1988, _The_Economist_ asserts about fisheries
that "left to their own devices, fishermen will overexploit stocks" and that "to avoid di-
saster, managers must have effective hegemony over them." Ibid., 8. But that assumption
cannot be made. It depends upon the social system within which the commons exist;
often, as Ostrom has demonstrated, control is possible without either state intervention
or a system of private property.

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